Edible insects – defining knowledge gaps in biological and ethical considerations of entomophagy by Pali-Schöll, Isabella et al.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=bfsn20
Critical Reviews in Food Science and Nutrition
ISSN: 1040-8398 (Print) 1549-7852 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/bfsn20
Edible insects – defining knowledge gaps
in biological and ethical considerations of
entomophagy
Isabella Pali-Schöll, Regina Binder, Yves Moens, Friedrich Polesny & Susana
Monsó
To cite this article: Isabella Pali-Schöll, Regina Binder, Yves Moens, Friedrich Polesny &
Susana Monsó (2018): Edible insects – defining knowledge gaps in biological and ethical
considerations of entomophagy, Critical Reviews in Food Science and Nutrition, DOI:
10.1080/10408398.2018.1468731
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/10408398.2018.1468731
© 2018 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
Accepted author version posted online: 25
Apr 2018.
Published online: 17 May 2018.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 103
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Edible insects – deﬁning knowledge gaps in biological and ethical considerations
of entomophagy
Isabella Pali-Sch€olla, Regina Binderb, Yves Moensc, Friedrich Polesnyd, and Susana Monsoe,f
aComparative Medicine, Messerli Research Institute of the University of Veterinary Medicine Vienna, Medical University Vienna and University Vienna,
Vienna, Austria; bInstitute of Animal Husbandry and Animal Welfare, Department of Farm Animals and Veterinary Public Health, University of Veterinary
Medicine Vienna, Vienna, Austria; cAnaesthesiology and Perioperative Intensive Care, University of Veterinary Medicine, Vienna, Austria; dAGES
Academy, Austrian Agency for Health and Food Safety (AGES), Vienna, Austria; eEthics and Human-Animal Studies, Messerli Research Institute of the
University of Veterinary Medicine Vienna, Medical University Vienna and University Vienna, Vienna, Austria; fSection of Moral and Political Philosophy,
Institute of Philosophy, Karl-Franzens-Universit€at Graz, Graz, Austria
ABSTRACT
While seeking novel food sources to feed the increasing population of the globe, several alternatives have
been discussed, including algae, fungi or in vitro meat. The increasingly propagated usage of farmed
insects for human nutrition raises issues regarding food safety, consumer information and animal
protection. In line with law, insects like any other animals must not be reared or manipulated in a way that
inﬂicts unnecessary pain, distress or harm on them. Currently, there is a great need for research in the area
of insect welfare, especially regarding species-speciﬁc needs, health, farming systems and humane
methods of killing. Recent results from neurophysiological, neuroanatomical and behavioral sciences
prompt caution when denying consciousness and therefore the likelihood of presence of pain and
suffering or something closely related to it to insects. From an animal protection point of view, these
issues should be satisfyingly solved before propagating and establishing intensive husbandry systems for
insects as a new type of mini-livestock factory farming.
Abbreviations: APA: Austrian Animal Protection Act; EC: European Community; EFSA: European Food Safety Agency;
EU: European Union; FDA: Food and Drug Administration; OJ: Ofﬁcial Journal of the European Union; PAP: processed
animal protein
KEYWORDS
Edible insects; ethical
aspects; legal situation; novel
food; nociception; rearing;
allergenicity; sentience;
entomophagy
1. Introduction
Anthropo-entomophagy, the consumption of insects as food by
humans, is no novel phenomenon, because obviously it has
been practiced since the very early development of human
beings (Sponheimer et al. 2005). Humans initially had an insec-
tivorous diet, and only with subsequent evolution came fruits,
vegetables and meat, when humans began hunting and eating
other mammals (reviewed in Ramos-Elorduy 2009). Today,
entomophagy is still a form of nutrition in over 100 countries,
mainly in Africa, Asia and Latin America, with over 2300 insect
species used for consumption by about 3000 ethnic groups (van
Huis et al. 2013). When seeking novel food sources to feed the
increasing population of the globe, several alternatives have
been discussed, including algae, fungi or in vitro meat. In addi-
tion, there are several arguments on the table for promoting
insects as novel food and novel feed worldwide, including in
industrialized Western countries.
First, there is the nutritional value of insects, namely their high
content of biologically valuable protein, optimal fatty acids and
several favorable micronutrients like copper, iron, magnesium,
riboﬂavin, biotin and others (Rumpold and Schluter 2013).
Further reasons for consuming insects are environmental.
De Goede et al. summarize the presumed environmental
advantages of insect farming (De Goede, Kapsomenou, and
Peters 2013), although one has to admit that —to the best of
the authors’ knowledge— there is no reliable calculation of the
overall ecological- or water-footprint or the risks of large-scale
mono-cultured insect farms in Western climate conditions.
However, another advantage seems to be their capacity for bio-
conversion, as insects can be reared on residual waste, such as
manure of poultry, swine and cow, as well as ﬁsh waste
(Ramos-Elorduy 2009; Rumpold and Schluter 2013; Ocio,
Vinaras, and Rey 1979). This feed can be converted very efﬁ-
ciently into biomass with a relatively low energy input, due to
the poikilothermic metabolism of insects (van Huis et al. 2013).
The rearing per se could be realized with much less land use
than other livestock (Oonincx et al. 2010), and with only low
space requirement, by piling multiple stories on top of each
other. Furthermore, it seems that emissions of greenhouse gases
and ammonia of commercially-reared insects are lower than in
the case of conventional livestock (Oonincx et al. 2010).
As there is a large phylogenetic distance between insects and
humans and other mammals, the risks of transmission of
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diseases from insects to humans are most probably very low
(van Huis et al. 2013). Finally, the introduction of insects as
feed, e.g. as substitute for ﬁshmeal, protects other species and
thereby biodiversity (Rumpold and Schluter 2013). All in all,
these arguments suggest many advantages of including edible
insects as novel food on our plates and novel feed in the bowls.
However, in addition, a number of controversial aspects have
to be considered, such as food and feed safety, consumer infor-
mation, and animal protection issues brought about by the
large scale breeding, rearing and killing of insects.
2. Legal situation – the European perspective
The usage of insects for human purposes (e.g. production of
silk and honey) has a long tradition in different parts of the
world. The same is true for entomophagy, i.e. the use of insects
for human consumption. In Western societies, however, the
use of insects as food is a very small niche market so far (EFSA
Scientiﬁc Committee 2015), although over the last years interest
in using insects as food and feed has been increasing and prop-
agated for various reasons (van Huis et al. 2013; EFSA Scientiﬁc
Committee 2015).
From the legal perspective, large-scale farming of insects for
the production of food and feed (for other farm animals) raises
primarily two issues: (i) the question of food safety, and (ii) the
issue of animal protection.
2.1. Food safety
With respect to the food safety issues involved in the use of
insects as food and feed, legislators have to pay special attention
to the general guidelines that apply to novel food, as well as to
any potential allergenicity risks.
2.1.1. Regulation of novel food
According to Regulation (EC) No 1069/20091, insects are
regarded as “farmed animals”. Insects, either whole or proc-
essed, are food as deﬁned by Art. 2 of Regulation (EC) No 178/
20022 and, like any other animals intended for human inges-
tion, are subject to the supranational and national legislation
on food safety3. Generally speaking, the processing and storage
of insects and products of insect origin have to follow the same
health and sanitation regulations as conventional foodstuff.
Additionally, the regulatory framework for novel food is
applicable. According to EU-legislation, novel food is deﬁned
as foods and food ingredients that have not been consumed to
a signiﬁcant degree by humans in the EU prior to May 15th,
1997, when the ﬁrst supranational regulation on novel food
came into force4.
Novel food in general and insects in particular may be
connected with a series of potential risks for human health
(e.g. biological and chemical hazards, allergenicity) and the
environment, which have to be assessed and minimized by
regulatory requirements. Because there is little experience
with the production and consumption of these foods, they
have to undergo a standardized safety assessment process
before being allowed to be marketed in the EU, in order to
make sure that they do not represent a risk to the con-
sumer. The ﬁrst EU regulation on novel food, dating back
to 1997, was superseded by a new European Novel Food
Regulation, which came into force on December 31st, 2015
and has been legally binding for the member states since
January 1st, 20185. This new regulatory framework is pri-
marily concerned with centralizing, simplifying and expedit-
ing evaluation and authorization procedures. Whereas
applications for authorization of a novel food item were
previously assessed in the individual member states, they
now are evaluated centrally by the European Food Safety
Authority (EFSA). Basically, individual authorizations are
replaced by general (generic) authorizations, applying not
only to the applicant, but to all distributors of the relevant
foodstuff.
With regard to foods that have been traditionally con-
sumed in third-party countries, safety evaluation will be
more efﬁcient in order to make access to the EU market
easier. In this way, according to Art. 14 of the new Novel
Food Regulation, a simpliﬁed authorization procedure (noti-
ﬁcation) is sufﬁcient if the safe use of the relevant food out-
side the EU can be demonstrated for a period of at least
25 years and no appeal is lodged by the member states or
the EFSA; in the latter case, the relevant food item is sub-
ject to the standard authorization process.
The use of insects as feed currently is limited to pets (such as
birds, reptiles and amphibians), because of the feed ban provi-
sions of Regulation (EC) No 999/20016 (TSE Regulation),
which do not allow insect Processed Animal Protein (PAP) to
be fed to farmed animals due to lack of a safety proﬁle (EFSA
Scientiﬁc Committee 2015).
2.1.2. Allergenicity
One of the safety points that have to be considered according to
the Novel Food directive is the allergenicity of edible insects.
For many insect species, it is already well-established that long-
term, high-antigen environmental exposure, e.g. of professional
insect farmers, leads to respiratory sensitization in a percentage1Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009 of the European Parliment and of the Council of
21 October 2009 laying down health rules as regards animal by-products and
derived products not intended for human consumption and repealing Regula-
tion (EC) No 1774/2002 (Animal by-products Regulation). OJ L 300/1, 14/11/2009.
2Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food
law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down proce-
dures in matters of food safety, OJ L 031, 01/02/2002.
3Cf. esp. Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 29 April 2004 on the hygiene of foodstuffs, OJ L 139/1, 30/4/2004;
€Osterr. Bundesgesetz €uber Sicherheitsanforderungen und weitere Anforderun-
gen an Lebensmittel, Gebrauchsgegenst€ande und kosmetische Mittel zum
Schutz der Verbraucherinnen und Verbraucher (Lebensmittelsicherheits- und
Verbraucherschutzgesetz – LMSVG), BGBl. I Nr. 13/2006 in its current version.
4Regulation (EC) No 258/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
January 1997 concerning novel foods and novel food ingredients, OJ L 043, 14/
02/1997.
5Regulation (EU) 2015/2283 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25
November 2015 on novel foods, amending Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of the
European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 258/
97 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Regulation
(EC) No 1852/2001, OJ L 327/1, 11/12/2015.
6Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
22 May 2001 laying down rules for the prevention, control and eradication of
certain transmissible spongiform encephalopathies, OJ L 147, 31/05/2001.
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of up to 50–60% of individuals rearing grasshoppers (Pener
2014; Lopata et al. 2005) or silkworm (Uragoda and Wijekoon
1991). Allergenicity also has to be considered in the domestic
context. A rather new development is the acquisition of reptiles
as pets in homes, which are fed live grasshoppers, and here the
owner has to consider the sensitization potential via the lung or
skin (Jensen-Jarolim et al. 2015).
Regarding the consumption of insects, there has been
some anecdotal data from China, which report 54 cases of
anaphylaxis due to consumption of short- or long-horned
grasshoppers between 1980 and 2007 (Ji et al. 2009). Fur-
thermore, around 1000 anaphylaxis cases per year occur
due to consumption of silkworm in China (Ji et al. 2008).
In recent studies from the Western countries, the potential
for cross-reactivity of crustacean- or house dust mite-aller-
gic patients to mealworm or grasshopper consumption has
been shown (Verhoeckx et al. 2016; Broekman et al. 2016;
Broekman et al. 2017; Broekman et al. 2017; Broekman
et al. 2015; Verhoeckx et al. 2014; van Broekhoven et al.
2016). Accordingly, the guidelines of the Austrian Federal
Ministry of Health and Women’s Affairs for insects strongly
recommend the labeling of edible insects and products
thereof with the potential risk of allergic reactions in people
who are allergic to crustaceans or house dust mites7.
Importantly, also primary sensitization can take place when
mealworms are eaten by humans (Broekman et al. 2017). These
studies furthermore point towards individual sensitization,
meaning that having an allergic reaction to one insect species
does not necessarily mean that an allergic reaction to all insects
will take place (Broekman et al. 2017). Therefore, as there are a
number of different insect species around and they might con-
tain different proteins, the allergenic potential probably needs
to be evaluated individually.
Taken together, neither the knowledge about cross-reactivity
nor about primary sensitization regarding edible insects is so
far complete. Furthermore, as insects are unlikely to be con-
sumed in a raw or whole state in our countries and therefore
presumably will arrive at the market in a processed form, it
would be ideal to reveal and legislate the most efﬁcient treat-
ment and technological processes to reduce the primary
sensitization capacity as well as cross-reactivity, which could be
successfully performed for migratory locust by protein hydroly-
sis (own unpublished data).
Apart from labeling potential allergenic reactions or cross-
reactivities, novel food must not be misleadingly labeled, which
is especially important with regard to products made of or con-
taining ingredients of insect origin that are not recognizable as
insects (e.g. powder, granules, paste).
2.2. Animal Protection
Large-scale farming of insects (mini-livestock) may cause a vari-
ety of animal protection issues, especially in the areas of rearing,
husbandry and killing, which seem to have been widely neglected
by regulatory frameworks and recommendations so far.
Collecting insects in the ﬁeld would make for a rather
uncertain source of food. If insects shall play an important
role in human nutrition, efﬁcient mass-rearing with mini-
mized input of materials, energy and labor is needed. Bee-
keeping for producing honey and breeding silk moths on
mulberry for silk production have a history of some thou-
sands of years. For decades there has been a lot of experi-
ence in mass-rearing of different insect plant pests to use
either directly in plant protection (sterile insect technique)
or as feed for mass rearing of beneﬁcials.
There is a lot of practical experience in breeding insects as
feed for animals in zoos (Figure 1) or private terrariums. Most
of these species are of interest for human nutrition, too.
The insect species eligible for mass-rearing for human nutri-
tion (De Goede, Kapsomenou, and Peters 2013; Schneider 2009;
Erens et al. 2012) will be those that allow for fast growth under
easy-to-maintain climatic conditions, as well as cheap and dispos-
able feed. In order to ensure minimumwelfare standards, the spe-
cies in question should also have a social behavior that allows the
individuals to be kept in relatively high densities without canni-
balism. These demands are met by several insect species:
 Species with provenience in tropic or subtropic regions
with rather stable climatic conditions (e.g. many locusts)
 Synanthropic species (e.g. cockroaches)
 Stored-food pests (e.g. mealworm, Tenebrio molitor L.)
 Saprophagous or carrion feeding species (e.g. Black sol-
dier ﬂy, Hermetia illucens L.)
Predatory insets will most probably not be suitable for mass-
breeding for human nutrition, because this would require a
Figure 1. Crickets Acheta domesticus (A) and Yellow mealworm Tenebrio molitor (B) reared as feed for reptiles and birds in the zoo.
7Leitlinie f€ur gez€uchtete Insekten als Lebensmittel. https://www.verbraucherge
sundheit.gv.at/lebensmittel/buch/codex/beschluesse/Insekten_LL.pdf?5th0ev
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mass-breeding of living insect feed in an upstream mode and
raise costs and necessary input.
For a stable mass-rearing of insects, a high level of hygiene is
a basic requirement. Otherwise the breeding will collapse
because of viral, bacterial or fungal pollution (Maciel-Vergara
and Ros 2017). Hygiene requirements for human food have
specialized standards, and the same will apply to the rearing of
insects from egg to adult.
The collection of the growth stage that is envisaged for usage
or processing for consumption, e.g. larvae or adult insects, and
the way to kill the specimen are both especially challenging.
There is a need for a fast and non-poisonous as well as non-
hurting killing of the target growth stage of the specimen before
it is prepared for food or feed use, as one method for killing
might not be optimal for every growth stage of a species. Fast
freezing and/or treating with boiling hot water are the two pre-
ferred ways, where the most “humane” way needs to be
assessed individually for every species and growth stage, e.g.
fast freezing seemed to be better for mealworm than boiling
(Adamkova et al. 2017).
Although according to the Scientiﬁc Opinion rendered by
the ESFA in 2015, the “general animal (vertebrate) health and
welfare regulations should also apply for insects”, the Art. 1 no.
2 d) of Council Directive 98/58/EC concerning the protection
of animals kept for farming purposes8 explicitly excludes “any
invertebrate animal” from its scope. Furthermore, the EFSA
itself deﬁned health and welfare of insects as an issue outside
the terms of reference of the above mentioned document. Simi-
larly, a guideline on farmed insects used as food, published by
the Austrian Federal Ministry of Health and Women’s Affairs,
which is competent for food safety as well as for animal welfare,
does not even touch upon the issue of animal protection,9
although the Austrian Animal Protection Act10 (APA) partly
covers all invertebrate animals and thus also applies to insects.
Although so far there is no conclusive evidence of sentience in
insects, some entomologists proposed to apply humane killing
techniques as early as in the ﬁrst third of the 19th century (Cooper
2011). In 1980, entomologist V.B. Wigglesworth recommended
anesthetizing insects prior to traumatizing manipulations in labo-
ratory settings, although he himself was convinced that insects by
and large do not feel pain (Eisemann et al. 1984). This precaution,
according to Wigglesworth, “not only facilitates handling,
but also guards against the remaining possibility of pain inﬂiction
and, equally important, helps to preserve in the experimenter an
appropriately respectful attitude towards living organisms whose
physiology, though different, and perhaps simpler than our own,
is as yet far from being completely understood” (Wigglesworth
1980). Thus, in laboratory settings it is increasingly regarded as
unacceptable to conduct invasive procedures on invertebrates
without “some form of chemical restraint, preferable through the
use of an agent with known anesthetic properties” (Cooper 2011;
Cooper 2001). Interestingly, despite this progressive attitude
towards insects’ possible sentience, invertebrates (except cephalo-
pods) are not subject to contemporary animal experimentation
legislation of the EU11.
From the legislative point of view it is not necessary that the
sentience (i.e. whether they are capable of experiencing pain or
suffering) of animals that fall within the scope of animal protec-
tion legislation be proven. With regard to its ethical foundation,
animal protection law may be divided into two types of clauses:
(1) pathocentrically-oriented pieces of legislation, which con-
sider only sentient animals, and (2) biocentric clauses, which
pertain to all animals. Although contemporary animal protec-
tion legislation is characterized predominately by pathocen-
trism, being mainly concerned with prohibiting the inﬂiction of
unjustiﬁed pain and suffering on sentient animals and with
safeguarding their well-being, it also includes biocentric ele-
ments, which typically are independent of an animal’s (actual
or proven) sentience (Binder, Grimm, and Schmid 2009).
Thus, the Austrian APA partially includes insects within its
scope (x 3/1 and 2 APA): while those parts of the APA relating to
husbandry conditions (xx 13ff. APA) and the obligation of ani-
mals’ keepers (x 12 APA) apply to vertebrates, cephalopods and
decapodes only, two important groups of provisions, namely the
ban of animal cruelty (x 5 APA) and the prohibition of killing ani-
mals without a justifying reason (x 6 APA), apply to all inverte-
brates; the same is true for the general requirements relating to
the methods of killing (x 32 APA), which stipulate that unneces-
sary pain and suffering must be avoided when killing an animal.
In line with x 5 APA (animal cruelty), insects, like any other
animals, must not be reared or manipulated in a way that inﬂicts
unnecessary pain, distress or harm on them. Regarding animals
whose sentience has not been proven, “harm” is the most impor-
tant type of interdicted impairment, because it is commonly
agreed upon that the concept of “harm” (“Schaden”) covers any
human-induced worsening of an animal’s condition (Binder
2014; Kluge 2002; Lorz and Metzger 2007; Hirt, Maisack, and
Moritz 2015), irrespective of the animal’s subjective perception.
Thus, a ﬂy is harmed if one of its legs or wings is torn off, because,
despite possible efforts to compensate for the loss, the animal, as
perceived from the outer perspective, deﬁnitely is worse off than
before, even if it is assumed that it neither feels any sort of pain
nor is suffering from distress.
The question of whether insects are able to feel pain remains
controversial (Elwood 2011) and although it is – as mentioned
above – ultimately irrelevant from the legal point of view whether
there is any evidence for sentience in insects, it is interesting from
the scientiﬁc as well as from the ethical point of view that there
are indications supporting the possibility of some sort of pain
experience in some taxa of insects. These indications, namely, the
well-established fact of nociception, the evidence of endogenous
opioids in insects and their (at least) rudimentary ability to learn
to avoid noxious stimuli (Eisemann et al. 1984; Elwood 2011) are
discussed in detail under “Physiological considerations” in the
8Directive 98/58/EC of 20 July 1998 concerning the protection of animals kept for
farming purposes, OJ L 221, 08/08/1998.
9Ministry of Health and Women’s Affairs (now Ministry of Health) (2017): Guide-
line for insects bred as food. Published with reference no: BMGF-75210/0003-II/
B/13/2017, 15/02/2017.
10Federal Act on the Protection of Animals (Animal Protection Act – APA; Tier-
schutzgesetz - TSchG), Federal Law Gazette I no 118/2004, Art. 2, in its current
version.
11Cf. Art. 1 no 3 of Directive 2010/63/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 22 September 2010 on the protection of animals used for scientiﬁc
purposes, OJ L 276/33, 20/10/2010; x 1/1 Austrian Federal Act on Animal Experi-
ments (Tierversuchsgesetz 2012 – TVG 2012), Federal Law Gazette I no 114/2012,
28/12/2012, Art. 1.
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present paper. These indications should be regarded as sufﬁcient
to strongly support the precautionary principle, which is inherent
in biocentric animal protection legislation, granting the beneﬁt of
the doubt to entities that are profoundly different from us and
whose potential “inner lives” cannot be conclusively accessed
because of epistemological12 boundaries.
As mentioned above, the APA’s regulatory framework
includes insects only partially, for x 3/2 APA stipulates that the
requirements laid down for animal husbandry do not apply to
invertebrates (other than cephalopods and decapods). The
large-scale farming of insects may, however, raise a range of
welfare issues, if their speciﬁc, species-related needs are not
considered appropriately. Among other problems, disease and
high mortality caused by inappropriate environmental condi-
tions (e.g. temperature, humidity, light), cannibalism due to
lack of space or malnutrition, and inhibition of natural behav-
ior, e.g. in migratory species like locusts, are mentioned in the
literature (Schneider 2009; Erens et al. 2012; Eisemann et al.
1984). Despite this fact, in Austrian animal protection legisla-
tion there are currently no provisions on the rearing and hus-
bandry of insects, neither in the general framework of the APA
(which establishes an obligation to consider physiological and
ethological needs of animals and to prevent husbandry-related
diseases as well as overstraining animals’ adaptability), nor
with regard to taxa-speciﬁc minimum requirements on statu-
tory level.
Another path is taken by the Dutch Animal Act13, which
came into effect in 2013 and comprises European Animal
Health Law as well as provisions in the area of animal protec-
tion. The latter part of the Dutch Animal Act, which is based
on the Five Freedoms deﬁned by F.W.R. Brambell in 1965
(Brambell 1965), lists a number of insect species as “production
animals”, whose well-being needs to be respected. Thus,
according to Dutch legislation, also insects should be free from
thirst, hunger and inappropriate feed, physical and physiologi-
cal inconvenience, pain, injury, and disease, fear and chronic
stress, and ﬁnally from limitations on natural behavior (De
Goede, Kapsomenou, and Peters 2013; Erens et al. 2012).
Commenting on the Dutch legislation, De Goede et al. (De
Goede, Kapsomenou, and Peters 2013) make the following sug-
gestions with respect to Brambell’s ﬁve freedoms (Brambell
1965):
1. Freedom from thirst, hunger and inappropriate feed:
Insects can be fed multiple plant and animal sources,
including waste (which is an environmental advantage).
They tend to get enough water from their feed, but some
species are prone to dehydration if there is not enough
water provisioning, and low humidity may negatively
inﬂuence food conversion efﬁciency (which may mean
that it also implies a negative subjective state for the
insects).
2. Freedom from physical and psychological inconvenience:
Many species are nocturnal, so a place to shelter during
the day may be necessary, in addition to the provision of
a day/night rhythm.
3. Freedom from pain, injury and disease: With regard to
the freedom from pain, this requirement is problematic
within the given context because of the lack of consensus
on insect pain. It should, however, be kept in mind, that
injury as well as disease are also relevant for animals that
are actually or presumably insentient, because they
invariably harm animals from an objective (external)
perspective. When it comes to humane killing methods,
very little is known, although freezing is usually consid-
ered humane and is currently the main killing technique.
And lastly, with respect to the freedom from disease,
there is such little scientiﬁc knowledge that this freedom
cannot currently be provided. When facilities are
infected by a virus, there tend to be high mortality rates.
4. Freedom from fear and chronic stress: There is a need to
investigate whether current rearing methods cause stress,
and whether it can be avoided. However, again, it is
unknown whether insects can experience these states
subjectively.
5. Freedom from limitations in natural behavior: Insect
farms tend to have a higher population density than natural
populations, which can lead to overheating. Different stages
within the lifecycle may require different rearing condi-
tions. With regard to certain speciﬁc insect species, it is
quite obvious that husbandry systems would prevent nor-
mal behavior. Thus, locusts, for example, are not allowed to
perform their extensive migratory and ﬂying behavior in
captivity, which could be detrimental for welfare.
Despite this precautionary principle, it could still be prefera-
ble to rear insects over traditional livestock as a food source,
because even if (some taxa of) insects do experience (some kind
of) pain, it does not seem far-fetched to suppose that they are
less sentient than vertebrate species, especially mammals. Here
it is interesting to note that laboratory animal legislation estab-
lishes as mandatory to choose those experimental designs
which “involve animals with the lowest capacity to experience
pain, suffering, distress or lasting harm.”14 This approach,
enshrined in laboratory animal legislation since its very begin-
ning in the last third of the 19th century (Binder 2014), might
lead to the far-reaching consequence that the usage of insects
as food source should have priority over the consumption of
traditional livestock for reasons of animal welfare (Principle of
Reﬁnement).
3. Physiological considerations
The intentional mass killing of insects for reasons of pest con-
trol, their incidental killing during daily activities as well as the
use of insects for biological research inevitably raise the ques-
tion of pain perception in these animals (Eisemann et al. 1984).
Today, the increasing importance of insects as a commercial
source of protein for human consumption further boosts the
interest in the topic.
12Epistemology is the study of knowledge. An epistemological problem is one
related to the methods we use to acquire knowledge.
13Animal Act 31 389 - Een integraal kader voor regels over gehouden dieren en
daaraan gerelateerde onderwerpen (Wet dieren).
14Art. 13/2/b) Directive 2010/63/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 22 September 2010 on the protection of animals used for scientiﬁc purposes,
OJ L 276/33, 20/10/2010; x 6/1/9 Austrian Federal Act on Animal Experiments.
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During the last decades, important progress has been made
in understanding the mechanisms of pain perception in mam-
mals and key ﬁndings are reported in current editions of major
textbooks (Tranquilli, Thurmon, and Grimm 2013; Grimm
et al. 2015).
In summary, there exists a general agreement that two key
components must be present for pain to be experienced: The
ﬁrst component is the ability of an animal to detect and react to
noxious stimuli by moving itself or the affected part of its body
rapidly away from the stimulus. This phenomenon — “noci-
ception” — may be a pure reﬂex response, which not necessar-
ily involves pain sensation. For the latter, a second component
is necessary, which represents the individual emotional and
subjective interpretation of the nociceptive experience — and
this requires a component of consciousness.
It has been shown that in vertebrates pain is experienced as a
result of central processing of input from free endings of noci-
ceptive nerves, so called nociceptors. Nociceptors detect stimuli
that are potentially harmful, like extreme temperatures, irritant
chemicals, electrical shocks or pronounced mechanical interfer-
ence. Most receptor endings are responsive to several types of
stimuli.
The signals generated from nociceptors travel via nerve ﬁbers
to the spinal cord. At the spinal level, nociceptive input may trig-
ger immediate somatic and sympathetic protective reﬂexes (noci-
ceptive reﬂex). At the same time, the signal output is locally
processed and transmitted to the brain via ventro-lateral ﬁber
tracts in the spinal cord, resulting in pain sensation. Considerable
modulation of the nociceptive input occurs at the spinal level via
ascending and descending inhibitory and excitatory pathways,
involving various neurotransmitters, substance P and endogenous
opioid peptides. At the level of the brain, the thalamus redirects
information to different areas in the cerebral cortex for interpreta-
tion, whereas the limbic system is responsible for the emotional
response. Eventually this can result in non-reﬂexive responses,
like for instance aggression or learned avoidance.
In the early eighties, Eisemann stated on the basis of differ-
ent arguments that insects are unlikely to experience pain (Eise-
mann et al. 1984). First, the nervous system of insects differs
greatly from that of vertebrate animals, as it has a relatively
simple organization and much fewer neurons. They lack the
higher neurological structures that translate an aversive
stimulus into an emotional experience. In the absence of noci-
ceptors and spinal reﬂex mechanisms, the aversive responses
by insects — which may resemble the nociceptive reﬂex — are
thought to occur following activation of particular nervous sys-
tem programs activated by excessive or abnormally-patterned
non-nociceptive sensory input. In contrast, the discovery of
endogenous opioid peptides and their receptor sites in some
insects (El-Salhy et al. 1983; Stefano and Scharrer 1981) and
the modulation by opiate agonists and antagonists of nocicep-
tive-type responses (Zabala et al. 1984) may indicate — in
analogy with their role in mammals — a capacity for pain per-
ception. Opioid peptides are known to also play a role in several
other physiological processes and thus their presence per se is
not a proof of the existence of mechanisms leading to pain per-
ception (Dyakonova 2001). These aforementioned facts, cou-
pled with behavioral observations of injured insects, which e.g.
continue normal feeding whilst heavily injured, showed,
according to Eisemann, that insects do not have a “pain sub-
program” (Eisemann et al. 1984).
Since then, important progress has been made in trying to
answer the question of whether insects can experience pain and
thus have a form of consciousness. Research from the last deca-
des as reviewed by Elwood (Elwood 2011) allows a more differ-
entiated view on the issue. More is known about the possible
neurophysiological pathways in insects confronted with aver-
sive conditions. Several neurotransmitters typically involved in
vertebrate pain pathways, such as serotonin and substance P,
have been identiﬁed in insects (El-Salhy et al. 1983; Wurden
and Homberg 1995).
In line with what happens in mammals, hormone-mediated
responses to stressful environmental conditions have been
identiﬁed in some insects. Various kinds of nociceptive neurons
responding e.g. to mechanical and thermal stimuli using molec-
ular mechanisms similar to nociceptive signal generation have
been identiﬁed in the fruit ﬂy Drosophila melanogaster (Hwang
et al. 2007). In fruit ﬂies, multi-dendrite nociceptive neurons
have been identiﬁed with ascending projections that cross the
midline to innervate contralateral postsynaptic targets (Guo
et al. 2014). This bears some similarity with pain processing in
vertebrates, but whether the brain of the larvae is involved in
perception of the noxious stimulus or whether lower-level
processing in the abdominal or thoracic ganglion plays a role
remains to be determined. Nowadays, while mammalian ani-
mal models are still the most frequently used for the study of
acute and chronic pain, the role of the fruit ﬂy as a model for
the study of nociception and the screening of potential analge-
sic substances has gained a lot of interest (Leung et al. 2013;
Manev and Dimitrijevic 2005), not in the last place because of
restrictive regulatory legislation associated with the use of ver-
tebrate animals in research. The use of the fruit ﬂy has also
facilitated research into the genetics of nociception with yields
of evidence of evolutionary continuities across vertebrates and
invertebrates, e.g. in the role of opioids in protection and sur-
vival of organisms.
While the complexity of insect behavior and the apparent
involvement of complex processing of neural information is now
well recognized, it is still thought that they lack the brain capacity
to experience emotion and evaluate injury, which are inseparable
from the experience of pain (Gullan and Cranston 2014).
Recently, Barron and Klein reviewed and compared the
structure and functions of the vertebrate midbrain with the
brain of insects (Barron and Klein 2016). They write that
“insect behavior involves multiple layers of ﬁltering of sensory
information to support selective attention to stimuli that are
salient and suppression of representation of irrelevant stimuli”.
The authors therefore presume that structures in the insect
brain function similarly to the human midbrain, an area that is
essential for subjective experience in humans and where also
consciousness is thought to emerge. They claim that conscious-
ness may be very ancient in evolution rather than something
that evolved only in “higher” vertebrates.
In conclusion, recent results from neurophysiological, neu-
roanatomical and behavioral sciences prompt caution when
denying consciousness, and therefore the likelihood of presence
of pain and suffering or something closely related to it, to
insects (Tifﬁn 2016). This strongly underlines earlier
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statements (Cooper 2011; Wigglesworth 1980; Elwood 2011;
Smith 1991) that while awaiting results of further research one
should consider the possibility that at least some insect species
might suffer pain and, as a precaution, always ensure humane
handling of these animals, including the application of anesthe-
sia and analgesia for painful procedures and humane killing
techniques.
4. Ethical considerations
4.1. The moral importance of sentience
One of the ﬁrst questions that needs to be asked when discussing
insect ethics, and arguably the most important one, is whether the
species we are dealing with is sentient. Indeed, the answer to this
question determines whether or not it makes sense to speak about
insect ethics altogether. Asking whether insects are sentient is not
the same as asking whether they possess nociception. Nocicep-
tion, as discussed above, can be deﬁned as the “capacity to
respond to potentially damaging stimuli” (Adamo 2016). In con-
trast, sentience is the capacity to feel, to undergo subjective, con-
scious experiences. These two capacities are in principle
independent of each other. In the case of humans, for instance, “it
is possible to have nociception without pain, and pain without
any activity in nociceptive ﬁbres” (Adamo 2016; Hardcastle
1997).While it is well established that insects possess a capacity to
respond to noxious stimuli (Eisemann et al. 1984; Adamo 2016),
theoretically it is possible for these responses to occur without the
presence or mediation of any conscious mental states, that is,
without sentience.
Asking whether insects are sentient may not be enough,
since not all forms of sentience may be relevant for morality.
For instance, Birch distinguishes two senses of the term ‘sen-
tient,’ only one of which is considered important for ethics
(Birch 2017). In a broad sense, sentience is equal to what is
often called ‘phenomenal consciousness.’ If an individual pos-
sesses sentience in this sense, it can be said that there is “some-
thing that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for
the organism” (Nagel 1974). Ascribing sentience, in this broad
sense, to an organism means that the experiences it undergoes
will have a certain subjective character, but this is not enough
to specify how this subjective character might actually feel.
In a narrow sense, sentience refers to the capacity to
undergo experiences that are felt, speciﬁcally, as attractive or
aversive. While narrow sentience requires broad sentience
(because experiencing something as attractive or aversive
already implies experiencing it), it is however possible for an
organism to possess phenomenal consciousness (or broad sen-
tience) without having the speciﬁc capacity to experience any-
thing as aversive or attractive.
It has been suggested by Godfrey-Smith (Godfrey-Smith
2017) that instead of speaking about narrow and broad sen-
tience, it might be more appropriate to consider different kinds
of basic subjectivity. Amongst these, he distinguishes sensory
subjectivity and evaluative subjectivity. Possessing sensory sub-
jectivity implies having the capacity to experience perceptual
states, while evaluative subjectivity is equal to what Birch terms
‘narrow sentience’ (Birch 2017), that is, the capacity to experi-
ence things as aversive or attractive.
According to Godfrey-Smith, sensory subjectivity and evalu-
ative subjectivity can exist independently from one another and
each may have played its own role in evolution. In fact, he lists
terrestrial arthropods as a potential example of perceptually
complex animals that lack evaluative subjectivity, and gastro-
pods as a possible example of creatures with an evaluative sub-
jectivity and no complex perception (Godfrey-Smith 2017).
What can conﬁdently be said when it comes to the treatment
of insects is that it neither matters whether they possess broad
sentience, nor whether they possess sensory subjectivity, but
whether or not members of these species can feel pain or suffer,
that is, whether they possess narrow sentience or evaluative
sentience. A being that lacks the capacity to experience any-
thing as aversive cannot feel pain and it cannot suffer. There-
fore, whatever happens to that being does not matter to that
being, and what is done to that being simply does not matter
from an ethical perspective. In this respect, we are focusing on
aversive experiences because these are the most obviously rele-
vant for ethics, but having the capacity to experience things as
attractive, that is, having the capacity to feel pleasure or ﬁnd
certain things enjoyable, also makes a difference to whether or
not the way an organism is treated matters to that organism.
A handful of ethicists would disagree here, since some ethi-
cal theories allow for duties or entitlements to emerge even in
the absence of narrow/evaluative sentience (hereafter ‘sen-
tience’). Amongst these we can ﬁnd, most notably, biocentrists
(a position that is reﬂected in some legislation, see above). For
biocentrists, insects would be entitled to moral consideration
due the simple fact that they are alive. However, there needs to
be a justiﬁcation as to why being alive entitles one to moral
consideration. In the case of sentience, the justiﬁcation is clear:
if an individual does not possess it, then nothing that happens
to that being can matter to it.
In the case of life, this justiﬁcation has proven to be very elu-
sive. Biocentrists often appeal to the notions of teleology (Holm
2017) or welfare (Nolt 2017) in order to justify the moral rele-
vance of life. They argue that all things that are alive are entitled
to moral consideration because they have a good of their own,
which is due to the fact that they have characteristics that are
directed towards an end (teleology) or to the fact that things
can go better or worse for them (welfare). However, biocentrists
are still haunted by the problem of scope. This problem refers
to the fact that the deﬁnitions of teleology and welfare cannot
easily leave out entities such as machines, bacteria, or meteoro-
logical phenomena, which also appear to have a good of their
own, but whose moral status is dubious at least.
Aside from these problems, the fact remains that the
moral relevance of life is disputed by many, while the moral
relevance of sentience is very rarely brought into question,
with some exceptions (Hsiao 2015). The question of
whether insects possess sentience thus seems like a good
place to start when determining whether or not they should
be granted moral status. Indeed, while sentience is not the
only thing that matters when determining the kind of moral
consideration that a being is owed, it can plausibly be con-
sidered “a threshold condition for membership in the com-
munity of beings who have entitlements based on justice”
(Nussbaum 2007), i.e. the community of beings who are
owed some sort of moral consideration.
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4.2. Sentience in insects
As opposed to European animal protection law, which (1) at
least partly applies to all invertebrates and (2) protects animals
not only from the unjustiﬁed inﬂiction of negative experiences
(like pain and suffering), but also from being harmed, i.e. from
negative impacts which are not necessarily accompanied by
subjective experiences, in ethics it is a widely accepted claim
that sentience is a precondition for moral standing. The prob-
lem is that determining whether a certain nonhuman species
possesses sentience is very difﬁcult. At the root of this difﬁculty,
we ﬁnd two classical philosophical problems. The ﬁrst one is
the problem of other minds. This problem emerges because
minds are necessarily private. One cannot directly observe
another’s subjective experiences. One can only observe the
behavioral or physiological correlates of these subjective experi-
ences. Thus, we can always doubt whether those around us
(even our fellow humans) have minds. Even more important is
the existence of another problem: the so-called ‘hard’ problem
of consciousness (Chalmers 1995). This boils down to the fact
that it is simply not yet known how consciousness emerges
from physical structures. Therefore, we cannot yet establish
with certainty which neuro-anatomical structures must be pres-
ent for an individual to be conscious. Thus, we can study the
physiology and the behavior of a species in order to attempt to
overcome the problem of other minds, but due to the ‘hard’
problem of consciousness, we cannot, as of yet, use the results
to conclusively establish whether a certain animal is sentient.
Due to the problem of other minds and the ‘hard’ problem
of consciousness, determining whether any nonhuman species
is sentient is always a difﬁcult endeavor. But while we can never
be absolutely certain that we have found consciousness in
another species, we can come pretty close in those cases in
which the animals are very similar to humans in neurophysio-
logical and behavioral terms (since, despite the philosophical
conundrum involved, no one seriously doubts that other
humans have minds).
The more a species differs from us, the more difﬁculties we
will encounter when determining whether its members are sen-
tient. In the case of insects, these difﬁculties are almost insur-
mountable. We cannot rely on verbal reports, as in the case of
humans, since obviously insects cannot speak. We also cannot
rely on arguments from analogy as in the case of vertebrates,
since insect physiology differs so much from our own. So, we
have to rely on ethological, neurological or neuro-ethological
approaches, but these are not as reliable as one would hope.
Both the neurological and the neuro-ethological approaches
inevitably encounter the ‘hard’ problem of consciousness. Until
the latter is solved, we cannot know for sure what the neural
correlates of consciousness are. As for ethological approaches,
these are also riddled with uncertainty, since the presence of a
certain behavior can never guarantee the presence of conscious-
ness. For instance, Adamo argues: “Robots are capable of dem-
onstrating pain-like behavior more similar to our own than any
insect … In fact, using behavioral criteria (Sneddon et al.
2014), an argument could be made that some present-day
robots are more deserving of ethical treatment and protection
(Levy 2009) than are insects” (Adamo 2017). Barron and Klein
(Barron and Klein 2016) have also argued that ethological
approaches tend to introduce a bias towards animals that do
clever or interesting things, even though this may not necessar-
ily be related to consciousness.
There is thus a fundamental epistemological problem: we
are, most likely, never going to conclusively determine whether
or not insects are sentient. However, it should be noted that
there is a very big difference between the size of insect and
mammalian brains. The brain of the honeybee, which is very
large for an insect, possesses less than one million neurons. In
comparison, the brains of mice (6.8 million neurons), rhesus
monkeys (6.4 billion neurons) and humans (86 billion neurons)
are enormous (Klein and Barron 2016). Some authors have
used this difference to argue that insect brains may not be big
enough to support sentience (Feinberg and Mallat 2016), while
others are conﬁdent that the number of neurons is not so
important, since the structures relevant for sentience may be
implemented on vastly different scales (Merker 2016). It may
be the case, however, that insect brains do support sentience
but that their experiences are less ﬁne-grained, less complex,
than those of animals with much bigger brains, like mammals.
This idea is supported by the fact that insects have been shown
to continue to use their limbs when they are damaged, eat their
own innards and feed while being consumed by another insect
(Eisemann et al. 1984). If they do feel pain, these considerations
suggest that it may somehow ‘feel less painful’ than it does in
other animals. This may be a relevant consideration to take
into account when their interests conﬂict with those of more
complex animals.
4.3. Appealing to a precautionary principle
As discussed before, it is virtually impossible for us to obtain
conclusive evidence of insect sentience. However, as is often
remarked in comparative cognition, absence of evidence is not
equal to evidence of absence. So, the fact that there are severe
epistemological obstacles to the study of insect sentience does
not, in and of itself, mean that insects are not sentient. In fact,
it may very well be that insects can feel pain and suffer and we
simply lack the tools to establish it scientiﬁcally. If insects were
indeed sentient, we might inadvertently be causing them seri-
ous suffering with our actions. Waiting until we have strong
evidence of their capacity to undergo conscious experiences
might take too long, and thus a better strategy might be to treat
them as if we already knew that they are sentient. Several ethi-
cists have defended this strategy by suggesting that we follow
some form of precautionary principle.
It would be absurd to include within the protection of a pre-
cautionary principle every single being for whom we don’t have
conclusive evidence of their lack of sentience, since this would
even require taking measures to protect inanimate objects from
pain, in case panpsychism were to be true. Therefore, any pre-
cautionary principle needs to be narrowed down. Along these
lines, Birch (Birch 2017) has formulated a precautionary princi-
ple that commits us to include within animal protection legisla-
tion all animals for which there is statistically signiﬁcant
evidence of the presence of at least one credible indicator of
sentience in at least one species of the order that those animals
belong to. The sorts of behaviors that he considers to be credi-
ble indicators of sentience are things like self-delivering
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analgesics, weighing the preference to avoid a noxious stimulus
against other preferences, and demonstrating an avoidance of
locations where noxious stimuli have been found before.
Other authors believe we should be less cautious towards
animals whose moral status is as uncertain as insects and
reserve greater protection for those species whose sentience has
been well established scientiﬁcally. Fischer, for instance,
defends a precautionary principle that establishes that we
should treat animals that are probably conscious as though
they were deﬁnitely conscious only in those cases where it
wouldn’t prevent us from fulﬁlling any obligation towards a
being that is deﬁnitely conscious (Fischer 2016). As for beings
who are perhaps conscious (a group where Fischer locates
insects), we should treat them as deﬁnitely conscious only
when their interests don’t conﬂict with beings that are deﬁnitely
or probably conscious.
Because prescribing a speciﬁc course of action can be very
problematic, due to the high number of intervening factors,
potential consequences and other relevant considerations that
must be taken into account, some ethicists consider that we
should be even less restrictive in our prescriptions. Knutsson &
Munthe (Knutsson and Munthe 2017), for example, take a vir-
tue ethics approach and defend the need to cultivate “…a char-
acter trait of being disposed to consider the possible moral
importance of these beings”. This way, rather than establishing
that we should always treat these beings as though they were
sentient, we should be open to taking these precautions or not,
depending on the situation, the potential consequences, the
price to pay, and so on. While this sort of precautionary
approach allows us to easily maneuver in the case of a conﬂict
of interests or a situation with high uncertainty regarding the
causal implications of our actions, one could also argue that it
is excessively vague and permissive, and that it could give too
much room for a mistreatment of possibly sentient beings.
4.4. Treatment of insects if they are sentient
If we were to establish that a certain species of insect that is cur-
rently raised for food is sentient (something that, as we have
seen, is not at all easy to determine), the immediate question
arises: what should we do about it? One possibility would be to
conclude that members of this species should be granted full
moral status, which implies a moral right to freedom and to
life, such as is defended by many animal rights activists and
theorists with respect to other species that are traditionally
raised for food. This would imply that we are no longer morally
allowed to use this species of insect in our food production.
This conclusion, however, immediately leads to several
problems. Firstly, it seems that other farmed species, such as
pigs, have a more urgent and justiﬁed claim to being liberated,
due to their much more complex ethological needs, which
arguably cannot be catered for in modern husbandry systems.
As Fischer has argued (Fischer 2016), we may have underesti-
mated the minds of insects, but it is highly unlikely that they
will rival the minds of highly complex animals like pigs. As
Nussbaum notes (Nussbaum 2004), the ways in which a being
can be harmed depend on the complexity of that being. More
complex beings will be capable of suffering more types of harm
than less complex beings. If being raised for food means
suffering more types of harm for pigs than it does for insects,
then arguably the former have a stronger case for being
liberated.
Moreover, a plausible case can be made to argue that those
who defend farm animal liberation in fact have a moral obliga-
tion to eat insects. This idea has been defended by Fischer
(Fischer 2016a) and it is based on the fact that the techniques
used for planting and harvesting fruits and vegetables routinely
harm or kill animals that happen to be in the ﬁeld and that
arguably have a higher claim to moral consideration than
insects, such as mice or rabbits. Combining a vegan diet with
the occasional consumption of insects might actually result in
less harm being delivered to animals with complex subjective
experiences than a strictly vegan diet. This argument might not
work, though, if the idea that raising insects for food implies an
instrumentalisation or a commodiﬁcation that is not present
when animals are killed as side-effects of the use of agricultural
machinery is factored in. However, it is unclear whether this
notion of instrumentalisation or commodiﬁcation can be easily
applied to the case of insects, and whether it would be enough
to trump the interest of mice and rabbits in continuing to live.
Fischer further notes that ascribing full moral status to
insects may also have many undesirable consequences (Fischer
2016): a huge number of them are killed by cars—would we
then have a moral obligation not to engage in non-essential
driving? Or should we let ﬂeas take over our dog’s body? And
what should we do about insecticides? Ascribing full moral sta-
tus to insects would imply a radical change in our lifestyles.
This is not enough to conclude that insects have no moral sta-
tus (slave-owners also had to face a radical change in their life-
styles when slavery was abolished), but together with the other
considerations it suggests that, with respect to insects, their
possession of sentience would likely point us in the direction of
welfare measures, rather than outright liberation.
A study by Adamkova et al. suggests that taking the welfare of
edible insects into account may actually have positive consequen-
ces that go beyond insect welfare (Adamkova et al. 2017). In the
case of mealworms, the species studied, they established that sub-
jecting the mealworms to nutritional deprivation affected their
welfare, but also had a negative effect on their nutritional value
and the economic aspects of their breeding. They also found that
the moment of death as well as the way of killing inﬂuenced the
nutritional value and the quality of the meat obtained. Death by
freezing, as opposed to boiling, was found to be better from both
a welfare and a nutritional perspective. Thus, in addition to the
ethical advantages, there may also be pragmatic reasons to ensure
the welfare of insects raised for food.
5. Knowledge gaps and future steps
Following Knutsson & Munthe (Knutsson and Munthe 2017)
we can identify six challenges that need to be overcome in the
ﬁeld of insect ethics. The ﬁrst challenge is to determine whether
or not insects are sentient. It is clear from what was discussed
above how difﬁcult answering this question is going to be. The
second challenge is to determine to what degree they are sen-
tient, meaning whether their sentience is of the morally relevant
sort and whether their experiences are as ﬁne-grained as those
of other animals.
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The third challenge is to establish how many beings are
involved in insect rearing and whether these numbers count
morally. While we have already seen that there are both envi-
ronmental and ethical advantages to consuming insects, the
fact is that many more individuals will have to die if we want to
obtain the same nutritional yield that we get from consuming
traditional sources of meat. We have to reach a consensus on
whether we consider these numbers to count morally. While
from the perspective of most consequentialist ethics these num-
bers would count, there have been some ethicists who have
argued that numbers are irrelevant for morality, i.e. that it is
just as bad to kill one individual as it is to kill a thousand
(Taurek 1977).
The three ﬁnal challenges that Knutsson & Munthe identify
relate to the costs that may come from ascribing moral status
to insects (Knutsson and Munthe 2017). The ﬁrst one is the
problem of how to assess the complex causal effects of our
actions. For instance, if we were to assign moral status to
insects and stop using pesticides, this might have long-term
effects on the population of insects and other animals, which
could lead to more suffering on the whole than using pesticides.
The second of these ﬁnal challenges is how to balance different
interests and values. It is clearly inevitable that the interests of
different species will conﬂict, so there needs to be a way of
establishing whose interests and which values will be favored.
And, lastly, it needs to be acknowledged that precaution does
not come for free, so the ﬁnal challenge is to determine what
price we are willing to pay in exchange for behaving cautiously
towards beings with uncertain sentience.
Aside from these challenges, we should obviously attempt to
provide welfare measures for the insects reared for food, not
only because of the ethical advantages, but also for pragmatic
reasons, as discussed above. The biggest knowledge gap that we
have to overcome is the topic of insect welfare, which is so
understudied that searching for “insect welfare” on Google
Scholar delivers: “Did you mean insect warfare?”. In addition,
an important point to bear in mind is that “…insect biodiver-
sity is too large to generalize upon welfare standards” (De
Goede, Kapsomenou, and Peters 2013). So it is not enough to
study a couple of species and then develop welfare standards
just based on these results. A good deal of research effort
should therefore go to studying the welfare of the insects cur-
rently reared for food and feed, and determining what the costs
of implementing welfare standards would be.
6. Conclusion
The increasingly propagated usage of farmed insects for
human nutrition raises issues regarding food safety, con-
sumer information and animal protection. While human-
related challenges have been addressed by supranational law
since the late 1990s, animal-related problems brought about
by large-scale farming of insects have been neglected so far.
National legislation differs with regard to the protection of
insects, but generally fails to address farming and killing of
insects comprehensively.
To eliminate this deﬁciency it would be necessary to fully
include insects into the scope of animal protection legisla-
tion and to deﬁne standard requirements for the rearing of
the most commonly farmed insects but also for insect taxa
bred as feed and kept as pets. On the other hand there is a
great need for research in the area of insect welfare, espe-
cially regarding species-speciﬁc needs, health, farming sys-
tems and humane methods of killing. From an animal
protection point of view these issues should be investigated
and satisfyingly solved before propagating and establishing
intensive husbandry systems for insects as a new type of
mini-livestock factory farming.
7. Summary
While seeking novel food sources to feed the increasing popula-
tion of the globe, several alternatives have been discussed,
including algae, fungi or in vitro meat. The increasingly propa-
gated usage of farmed insects for human nutrition raises issues
regarding food safety, consumer information and animal pro-
tection. In line with law, insects like any other animals must
not be reared or manipulated in a way that inﬂicts unnecessary
pain, distress or harm on them.
Currently, there is a great need for research in the area of
insect welfare, especially regarding species-speciﬁc needs,
health, farming systems and humane methods of killing. Recent
results from neurophysiological, neuroanatomical and behav-
ioral sciences prompt caution when denying consciousness and
therefore the likelihood of presence of pain and suffering or
something closely related to it to insects.
From an animal protection point of view, these issues should
be satisfyingly solved before propagating and establishing
intensive husbandry systems for insects as a new type of mini-
livestock factory farming.
Conﬂict of interest
The authors declare no conﬂict of interest.
Authors’ contribution
IPS was responsible for conception of the review, IPS and SM contributed
the introductory part; RB wrote the part of legislation/regulation, FP about
biological considerations, IPS the allergenicity sub-section, YM about noci-
ception and analgesia, and SM about the ethical considerations. All authors
edited the article and approved the ﬁnal version.
Funding
Financial support to IPS during research for this review was provided by
the Austrian Science Fund FWF (project SFB F4606-B28 to Erika Jensen-
Jarolim).
References
Adamkova, A., M. Adamek, J. Mlcek, M. Borkovcova, M. Bednarova, L.
Kourimska, J. Skacel, and E. Vıtova. 2017. Welfare of the mealworm
(Tenebrio molitor) breeding with regard to nutrition value and food
safety. Potravinarstvo Slovak Journal of Food Sciences 11 (1), 460–465.
doi:10.5219/779.
Adamo, S. A. 2016. Do insects feel pain? A question at the intersection of
animal behaviour, philosophy and robotics. Animal Behaviour 118
(Supplement C):75–79. doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2016.05.005.
10 I. PALI-SCH€OLL ET AL.
Adamo, S. A. 2017. The stress response and immune system share, borrow,
and reconﬁgure their physiological network elements: Evidence from
the insects. Hormones and Behavior 88:25–30. doi:10.1016/j.
yhbeh.2016.10.003.
Broekman, H., K. C. Verhoeckx, C. F. den Hartog Jager, A. G. Kruizinga,
M. Pronk-Kleinjan, B. C. Remington, C. A. Bruijnzeel-Koomen, G. F.
Houben, and A. C. Knulst. 2016. Majority of shrimp-allergic patients
are allergic to mealworm. Journal of Allergy and Clinical Immunology
137 (4):1261–63. doi:10.1016/j.jaci.2016.01.005.
Broekman, H., A. C. Knulst, C. F. den Hartog Jager, J. H. M. van Bilsen, F.
M. L. Raymakers, A. G. Kruizinga, M. Gaspari, C. Gabriele, C. Bruijn-
zeel-Koomen, G. F. Houben, and K. C. M. Verhoeckx. 2017. Primary
respiratory and food allergy to mealworm. Journal of Allergy and Clini-
cal Immunology 140 (2):600–603 e7. doi:10.1016/j.jaci.2017.01.035.
Broekman, H., A. C. Knulst, G. de Jong, M. Gaspari, C. F. den Hartog
Jager, G. F. Houben, and K. C. M. Verhoeckx. 2017. Is mealworm or
shrimp allergy indicative for food allergy to insects? Molecular Nutri-
tion & Food Research 61 (9) doi:10.1002/mnfr.201601061.
Broekman, H., A. Knulst, S. den Hartog Jager, F. Monteleone, M. Gaspari,
G. de Jong, G. Houben, and K. Verhoeckx. 2015. Effect of thermal
processing on mealworm allergenicity. Molecular Nutrition &Amp;
Food Research 59 (9):1855–64. doi:10.1002/mnfr.201500138.
Binder, R., H. Grimm, and E. Schmid. 2009. Ethical principles for the use
of animals in Austrian legislation. EurSafe 2009. ^eds. Ethical futures:
bioscience and food horizons, Nottingham, United Kingdomed: Wage-
ningen Academic Publ, 123–29.
Binder, R. 2014. Das €osterreischische Tierschutzrecht. Tierschutzgesetz und
Tierversuchsgesetz 2012 mit ausf€uhrlicher Kommentierung. Manz’sche
Verlags- und Universit€atsbuchhandlung.
Brambell, R. 1965. Report of the technical committee to enquire into the
welfare of animals kept under intensive livestock husbandry systemsed.
Great Britain Parliament 1–84.
Binder, R. 2014. Laboratory animal law: An introduction to its history and
principles. In Comparative medicine: anatomy and physiology, ed. E.
Jensen-Jarolim, 267–80 ^eds. Vienna: Springer.
Barron, A. B., and C. Klein. 2016. What insects can tell us about the origins
of consciousness. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America 113 (18):4900–4908. doi:10.1073/
pnas.1520084113.
Birch, J. 2017. Animal sentience and the precautionary principle. Animal
Sentience: An Interdisciplinary Journal on Animal Feeling 2 (16):1–15.
ISSN 2377-7478.
Cooper, J. E. 2011. Anesthesia, analgesia, and euthanasia of invertebrates.
Ilar Journal 52 (2):196–204. doi:10.1093/ilar.52.2.196.
Cooper, J. E. 2001. Invertebrate anesthesia. ed.^eds. Analgesia and Anesthe-
sia. Veterinary Clinics of North America: Exotic Animal Practice 4 (1):57–
67.
Chalmers, D. J. 1995. Facing up to the problem of consciousness. Journal of
Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200–19.
De Goede DM, E. J., E. Kapsomenou, and M. Peters. 2013. Large scale
insect rearing and animal welfareed. In. The ethics of consumption, eds.
H. R€ocklinsberg, P. Sandin, 236–42. Wageningen:Wageningen Aca-
demic Publishers.
Dyakonova, V. E. 2001. Role of opioid peptides in behavior of inverte-
brates. Journal of Evolutionary Biochemistry & Physiology 37 (4):335–
47. doi:10.1023/A:1012910525424.
Erens, J., S. Es van, F. Haverkort, E. Kapsomenou, and A. H. Luijben. 2012.
A bug’s life. Large-scale insect rearing in relation to animal welfare. In
welfare’ RtpL-sirirta. Wageningen University. Retrieved from http://
venik.nl/site/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Rapport-Large-scale-insect-
rearing-in-relation-to-animal-welfare.pdf
Eisemann, C. H., W. K. Jorgensen, D. Merritt, M. Rice, B. Cribb, D. Webb
P, and P. M. Zalucki. 1984. Do insects feel pain? — A biological view.
Experientia 40:164–67. doi:10.1007/BF01963580.
Elwood, R. W. 2011. Pain and suffering in invertebrates? ILAR J 52
(2):175–84. doi:10.1093/ilar.52.2.175.
El-Salhy, M., S. Falkmer, K. J. Kramer, R. D. Speirs. 1983. Immunohisto-
chemical investigations of neuropeptides in the brain, corpora cardiaca,
and corpora allata of an adult lepidopteran insect, Manduca sexta (L).
Cell Tissue Res 232 (2):295–317. doi:10.1007/BF00213788.
Feinberg, T. E., and J. M. Mallat. 2016. The ancient origins of consciousness:
How the brain created experience. Cambridge, MA:The MIT Press.
Fischer, B. 2016a. Bugging the strict vegan. Journal of Agricultural and
Environmental Ethics 29 (2):255–63. doi:10.1007/s10806-015-9599-y.
Fischer, B. 2016. What if Klein & Barron are right about insect sentience?
Animal Sentience: An Interdisciplinary Journal on Animal Feeling 1
(9):1–6.
Grimm, K. A., L. A. Lamont, W. J. Tranquilli, S. A. Greene, S. A. Robert-
son, W. J. Tranquilli, J. C. Thurmon, K. A. Grimm. 2015. Veterinary
anesthesia and analgesia: the ﬁfth edition of lumb and jones.
Guo, Y., Y. Wang, Q. Wang, and Z. Wang. 2014. The role of PPK26 in
Drosophila larval mechanical nociception. Cell Reports 9 (4):1183–90.
doi:10.1016/j.celrep.2014.10.020.
Gullan, P. J., and P. S. Cranston. 2014. The insects: an outline of entomol-
ogy. Oxford, UK:Wiley Blackwell.
Godfrey-Smith, P. 2017. The evolution of consciousness in phylogenetic
context. In The routledge handbook of philosophy of animal minds, eds.
K Andrews and J Beck, 216–26. ed. New York:Routledge.
Hirt, A., C. Maisack, J. Moritz. 2015. Tierschutzgesetz: mit TierSchHundeV,
TierSchNutztV, TierSchVersV, TierSchTrV, EU-Tiertransport-VO,
TierSchlV, EU-Tierschlacht-VO. Munich: Vahlen.
Hwang, R. Y., L. Zhong, Y. Xu, T. Johnson, F. Zhang, K. Deisseroth, and
W. D. Tracey. 2007. Nociceptive neurons protect Drosophila larvae
from parasitoid wasps. Current biology: CB 17 (24):2105–16.
doi:10.1016/j.cub.2007.11.029.
Hardcastle, V. G. 1997. When a pain is not. The Journal of Philosophy 94
(8):381–409. doi:10.2307/2564606. https://doi.org/10.2307/2564606.
Holm, S. 2017. Teleology and biocentrism. Synthese 194 (4):1075–87.
doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1300-0.
Hsiao, T. 2015. In defense of eating meat. Journal of Agricultural and Envi-
ronmental Ethics 28 (2):277–91. doi:10.1007/s10806-015-9534-2.
Jensen-Jarolim, E., I. Pali-Scholl, S. A. Jensen, B. Robibaro, and T.
Kinaciyan. 2015. Caution: Reptile pets shuttle grasshopper allergy and
asthma into homes. World Allergy Organ J 8 (1):24. doi:10.1186/
s40413-015-0072-1.
Ji, K., J. Chen, M. Li, Z. Liu, C. Wang, Z. Zhan, X. Wu, and Q. Xia. 2009.
Anaphylactic shocks and lethal anaphylaxis caused by food consump-
tion in China. Trends in Food Science & Technology 20:227–31.
doi:10.1016/j.tifs.2009.02.004.
Ji, K. M., Z. K. Zhan, J. J. Chen, and Z. G. Liu. 2008. Anaphylactic shock
caused by silkworm pupa consumption in China. Allergy 63 (10):1407–
1408. doi:10.1111/j.1398-9995.2008.01838.x.
Kluge, H. G. 2002. Tierschutzgesetz: Kommentar mit den wichtigsten auf
der Grundlage des Tierschutzgesetzes ergangenen Rechtsverordnungen
und einschl€agigen europarechtlichen Texten. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
Klein, C., and A. Barron. 2016. Insects have the capacity for subjective
experience. Animal Sentience: An Interdisciplinary Journal on Animal
Feeling 1 (9):1–19.
Knutsson, S., and C. Munthe. 2017. A virtue of precaution regarding the
moral status of animals with uncertain sentience. Journal of Agricul-
tural and Environmental Ethics 30 (2):213–24. doi:10.1007/s10806-
017-9662-y.
Lopata, A. L., B. Fenemore, M. F. Jeebhay, G. Gade, and P. C. Potter. 2005.
Occupational allergy in laboratory workers caused by the African
migratory grasshopper Locusta migratoria. Allergy 60 (2):200–205.
doi:10.1111/j.1398-9995.2005.00661.x.
Lorz, A., E. Metzger. 2007. Tierschutzgesetz mit allgemeiner verwaltungs-
vorschrift, rechtsverordnungen und europ€aischen €ubereinkommen. kom-
mentar. Munich: H.C. Beck.
Leung, C., Y. Wilson, T. M. Khuong, and G. G. Neely. 2013. Fruit ﬂies as a
powerful model to drive or validate pain genomics efforts. Pharmacoge-
nomics 14 (15):1879–87. doi:10.2217/pgs.13.196.
Levy, D. 2009. The ethical treatment of artiﬁcially conscious robots. Inter-
national Journal of Social Robotics 1 (3):209–16. doi:10.1007/s12369-
009-0022-6.
Maciel-Vergara, G., and V. I. D. Ros. 2017. Viruses of insects reared for
food and feed. Journal of Invertebrate Pathology 147:60–75.
doi:10.1016/j.jip.2017.01.013.
Manev, H., and N. Dimitrijevic. 2005. Fruit ﬂies for anti-pain drug discov-
ery. Life sciences 76 (21):2403–2407. doi:10.1016/j.lfs.2004.12.007.
CRITICAL REVIEWS IN FOOD SCIENCE AND NUTRITION 11
Merker, B. 2016. Insects join the consciousness fray. Animal Sentience: An
Interdisciplinary Journal on Animal Feeling 1 (9):1–3.
Nagel, T. 1974. What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review 83
(4):435–450. doi:10.2307/2183914.
Nolt, J. 2017. Are there inﬁnite welfare differences among living things? Envi-
ronmental Values 26 (1):73–89. doi:10.3197/096327117X14809634978591.
Nussbaum, M. C. 2007. Frontiers of justice: Disability, nationality, species
membership. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.
Nussbaum, M. C. 2004. Beyond “compassion and humanity”: Justice for
nonhuman animals. In Animal Rights: Current debates and new direc-
tions, eds. C. R. Sunstein and M. C. Nussbaum, 299–320. ed. New
York, USA: Oxford University Press.
Ocio, E., R. Vinaras, and J. M. Rey. 1979. Houseﬂy larvae meal frown on
municipal organic waste as a source of protein in poultry diets. Animal
Feed Science and Technology 4 (3):227–31. doi:10.1016/0377-8401(79)
90016-6.
Oonincx, D. G., J. van Itterbeeck, M. J. Heetkamp, H. van den Brand, J. J. van
Loon, and A. van Huis. 2010. An exploration on greenhouse gas and
ammonia production by insect species suitable for animal or human con-
sumption. Plos One 5 (12):e14445. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014445.
Pener, M. P. 2014. Allergy to locusts and acridid grasshoppers: a review.
Journal of Orthoptera Research 23 (1):59–67. doi:10.1665/034.023.0105.
Ramos-Elorduy, J. 2009. Anthropo-entomophagy: Cultures, evolution and
sustainability. Entomological Research 39:271–88. doi:10.1111/j.1748-
5967.2009.00238.x.
Rumpold, B. A., and O. K. Schluter. 2013. Nutritional composition and
safety aspects of edible insects. Molecular Nutrition &Amp; Food
Research 57 (5):802–23. doi:10.1002/mnfr.201200735.
Sponheimer, M., D. de Ruiter, J. Lee-Thorp, and A. Spath. 2005. Sr/Ca and
early hominin diets revisited: new data from modern and fossil tooth
enamel. Journal of Human Evolution 48 (2):147–56. doi:10.1016/j.
jhevol.2004.09.003.
Scientiﬁc Committee, E. F. S. A. 2015. Scientiﬁc opinion on a risk proﬁle
related to production and consumption of insects as food and feed.
EFSA Journal 13 (10):4257. doi:10.2903/j.efsa.2015.4257.
Schneider, J. C. 2009. Environmental biology of insect rearing. In Principles
and procedures for rearing high quality insects, 97–120, chapter 6, ed. J.
C. Schneider. Mississippi, MS: Mississippi state University.
Stefano, G. B., B. Scharrer. 1981. High afﬁnity binding of an enkephalin
analog in the cerebral ganglion of the insect Leucophaea maderae
(Blattaria). Brain Research 225 (1):107–14. doi:10.1016/0006-8993(81)
90321-8.
Smith, J. A. 1991. A question of pain in invertebrates. ILAR Journal 33 (1–
2):25–31. doi:10.1093/ilar.33.1-2.25.
Sneddon, L. U., E. W. Elwood, S. A. Adamo, and M. C. Leach. 2014. Deﬁn-
ing and assessing animal pain. Animal Behaviour 97:201–12.
doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2014.09.007.
Tranquilli, W. J., J. C. Thurmon, K. A. Grimm. 2013. Lumb and Jones’ Veteri-
nary Anesthesia and Analgesiaed.^eds. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.
Tifﬁn, H. 2016. Do Insects Feel Pain? Animal Studies Journal 5 (1):80–96.
Taurek, J. M. 1977. Should the numbers count? Philosophy & Public Affairs
6 (4):293–316.
Uragoda, C. G., and P. N. Wijekoon. 1991. Asthma in silk workers. Journal
of the Society of Occupational Medicine 41 (3):140–42. doi:10.1093/
occmed/41.3.140.
van Huis A, V. I. J., H. Klunder, E. Mertens, A. Halloran, G. Muir, and P.
Vantomme. 2013. Edible insects: Future prospects for food and feed
security. FAO Forestry Paper 171:1–186.
Verhoeckx, K., H. Broekman, A. Knulst, and G. Houben. 2016. Allergenic-
ity assessment strategy for novel food proteins and protein sources.
Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology 79:118–24. doi:10.1016/j.
yrtph.2016.03.016.
Verhoeckx, K. C., S. van Broekhoven, C. F. den Hartog-Jager, M. Gaspari,
G. A. de Jong, H. J. Wichers, E. van Hoffen, G. F. Houben, and A. C.
Knulst. 2014. House dust mite (Der p 10) and crustacean allergic
patients may react to food containing Yellow mealworm proteins.
Food and Chemical Toxicology 65:364–73. doi:10.1016/j.fct.2013.12.049.
van Broekhoven, S., S. Bastiaan-Net, N. W. de Jong, and H. J. Wichers.
2016. Inﬂuence of processing and in vitro digestion on the allergic
cross-reactivity of three mealworm species. Food Chemistry 196:1075–
83. doi:10.1016/j.foodchem.2015.10.033.
Wigglesworth, V. B. 1980. Do insects feel pain? Antenna 4:8–9.
Wurden, S., and U. Homberg. 1995. Immunocytochemical mapping of
serotonin and neuropeptides in the accessory medulla of the locust,
Schistocerca gregaria. The Journal of comparative neurology 362
(3):305–19. doi:10.1002/cne.903620302.
Zabala, N. A., A. Miralto, H. Maldonado, J. A. Nunez, K. Jaffe, and L. D.
Calderon. 1984. Opiate receptor in praying mantis: effect of morphine
and naloxone. Pharmacology, Biochemistry, And Behavior 20 (5):683–
87. doi:10.1016/0091-3057(84)90185-0.
12 I. PALI-SCH€OLL ET AL.
